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FORCE MAJEURE, VIS MAJOR, IMPOSSIBILITY, AND
IMPRACTICABILITY UNDER OHIO LAW BEFORE AND AFTER
COVID-19
Laura Gates

I. INTRODUCTION
It is a tale as old as time—when the economy thrives, businesses grow,
and deals are made. Transactional attorneys draw up contracts, affix
signatures, and give handshakes and felicitations all around. But just as
Isaac Newton warned us that what goes up, must come down, so too does
the economy inevitably falter. When this happens, contracts fail—
suppliers fail to deliver goods, businesses lay off workers, and litigators
circle the carnage like buzzards.1 In the cases where things fall apart
dramatically, judges must interpret these failed contracts to determine
what is owed and to whom.
One recent example of this cycle occurred during the COVID-19
pandemic of 2020.2 However, this pandemic is far from the first time that
this cycle of boom and bust has happened.3 To protect business
transactions and mitigate risk in case of disaster, contract drafters have
developed several boilerplate clauses, including force majeure clauses.4
Furthermore, courts in every jurisdiction, including Ohio, have adopted
methods for interpreting these provisions. In addition, the common law
doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and vis major give parties
some grace for nonperformance under certain unforeseen circumstances.5
While courts have grappled with disasters and broken contracts in the
past, the COVID-19 pandemic created cataclysmic and unprecedented
effects for large sectors of the American economy.6 It remains to be seen
exactly how these doctrines and interpretations will stay consistent or
change over time as Ohio courts reopen, and the inevitable flood of
litigation moves through the court system.

1. Jeremiah A. Ho, Why Flexibility Matters: Inequality and Contract Pluralism, 18 U.C. DAVIS
BUS. L. J. 35, 40 (2018).
2. Andrew A. Schwartz, Contracts and COVID-19, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 48 (2020).
3. See Hanover Petroleum Corp. v. Tenneco, 521 So. 2d 1234 (La. Ct. App. 1988) (a breach of
contract dispute resulting from the recession of the early 1980s and the 1979 energy crisis); Great Lakes
Gas Transmissions Ltd. P’ship v. Essar Steel Minn., LLC, 871 F.Supp.2d 843 (D. Minn. 2012) (a breach
of contract dispute resulting from the Great Recession of 2008).
4. 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:31 (4th ed. 2020).
5. 30 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 77:6 (4th ed. 2020).
6. Lauren Bauer et al., Ten Facts about COVID-19 and the U.S. Economy, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE
(Sept.
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2020/09/FutureShutdowns_Facts_LO_Final.pdf.
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Optimistically, one could argue that the need for such analysis is
waning. Throughout the end of 2020 and into 2021, more and more
pharmaceutical companies have developed COVID-19 vaccines, which
have and will continue to normalize life. As of February 2021, two
pharmaceutical companies have developed vaccines (which have
received emergency authorization) that could be over 90 percent effective
against COVID-19.7 However, even with approval and distribution of
vaccines, the aggregated effects of COVID-19 will not disappear
overnight. Cases about this period of time will likely come to the courts
for years to come, and it will be critical for courts to develop sound
interpretative principles.
This Comment assesses the past, present, and future of force majeure,
impossibility, impracticability, and related doctrines under Ohio law in
light of COVID-19. Section II examines the history of these doctrines in
Ohio courts, as well as the history of the COVID-19 pandemic and certain
law and economics principles. Section III analyzes how Ohio courts likely
would apply these doctrines and interpretations (as they currently exist)
to cases involving breach of contract due to COVID-19, and also how
they should apply these doctrines and interpretations.
II. BACKGROUND
Understanding how Ohio courts might apply different contract
defenses and excuses for nonperformance in light of the COVID-19
pandemic requires both an understanding of the impact of COVID-19 on
businesses in Ohio, and of how Ohio courts have applied these defenses
and excuses for nonperformance prior to the pandemic. Part A of this
Section discusses the impact of COVID-19 on businesses in Ohio. Part B
of this Section explores how Ohio courts have applied various contract
defenses for nonperformance. Finally, Part C of this Section examines the
methods that courts and legal scholars have used to determine how to
distribute the costs of contract breach.
A. COVID-19 and the Business Landscape in Ohio
COVID-19 has had a devastating impact on both public health and the

7. Carolyn Y. Johnson & Aaron Steckelberg, What You Need to Know About the Moderna and
Pfizer
Coronavirus
Vaccines,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Nov.
17,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/health/2020/11/17/covid-vaccines-what-you-need-toknow/?arc404=true.
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economy, in Ohio8 and around the world.9 The first reported case in Ohio
was on March 9, 2020,10 and the first reported death was on March 19,
202011 (although the true first cases and deaths likely happened earlier in
2020).12 As of February 22, 2021, there have been 821,016 total cases and
14,351 total deaths from COVID-19 in Ohio.13
In an effort to “flatten the curve,”14 Governor Mike DeWine and former
Ohio Department of Health Director Dr. Amy Acton acted swiftly,
producing dramatic economic consequences.15 From March 23, 2020 to
April 30, 2020, there was a statewide stay-at-home order that enforced the
temporary closure of all nonessential businesses.16 Beginning on May 1,
2020, and continuing throughout the summer and fall, businesses were
gradually allowed to reopen, as long as they complied with restrictions
like capacity limitations, social distancing, mask-wearing, and
sanitization.17
Determining to what extent the stay-at-home order caused the recession
that followed, and to what extent a recession would have resulted
regardless of government action in Ohio and beyond, is outside of the
scope of this Comment. However, it is undeniable that the COVID-19
pandemic has resulted in the worst economic downturn that the world has
8. Iryna Demko et al., From Economic Slowdown to Recession, URBAN PUBLICATIONS (May
2020),
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2653&context=urban_facpub&_ga=
2.12481776.53929860.1606673871-688431904.1606673871.
9. Global
Economic
Prospects,
WORLD
BANK
GROUP
(June
2020),
https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/global-economic-prospects.
10. Emily Bamforth, Coronavirus Timeline: How the Coronavirus Spread from Cases in China
to
Ohio
in
Less
than
Three
Months,
CLEVELAND.COM
(Mar.
13,
2020),
https://www.cleveland.com/news/2020/03/coronavirus-timeline-how-the-coronavirus-spread-fromcases-in-china-to-ohio-in-less-than-three-months.html.
11. Gabe Rosenberg, Coronavirus in Ohio: State Confirms First Death from COVID-19, WOSU
(Mar. 20, 2020), https://radio.wosu.org/post/coronavirus-ohio-state-confirms-first-death-covid-19.
12. Rich Exner, State Now Identifies 302 Cases Pre-Dating First Confirmations of Coronavirus
in
Ohio
March
9,
CLEVELAND.COM
(June
11,
2020),
https://www.cleveland.com/datacentral/2020/06/state-now-identifies-302-cases-pre-dating-firstconfirmations-of-coronavirus-in-ohio-march-9.html.
13. Coronavirus (COVID-19), OHIO DEP'T OF HEALTH (last visited Nov. 29, 2020),
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/home.
14. “Flattening the curve” is a term in public health, coined by Dr. Howard Markel, referring to
an effort to decrease spikes in the number of infected people who need intensive medical care, so as to
lessen the burden on healthcare workers.
15. Jennifer Edwards Baker, Can Ohio’s small businesses recover from coronavirus economic
shutdown? FOX 19 (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.fox19.com/2020/04/07/can-ohios-small-businessesrecover-coronavirus-economic-shutdown.
16. Amended Director’s Stay-at-Home Order, OHIO DEP'T OF HEALTH (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/publicorders/Directors-Stay-At-Home-Order-Amended-04-02-20.pdf.
17. Business/Employers – Covid-19 Checklist, OHIO DEP'T OF HEALTH (July 21, 2020),
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/checklists/english-checklists/BusinessesEmployers-COVID-19-Checklist.
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seen since the Great Recession.18 Moreover, the effects of this
pandemic—both social and in terms of public health—have not been felt
evenly across all sectors and socioeconomic groups. Although the
demand for goods19 and housing20 has increased, the overall demand for
services—including everything from hotels, to air travel, to retail, to
entertainment—has sharply declined.21
This is especially apparent in the data on jobs growth, which reflects
the imbalance between sectors described above.22 By October 2020, the
total nonagricultural labor force in Ohio was down 6.34 percent from the
prior year.23 However, broken down by sector, employers involved in the
production of goods experienced only a 4.2 percent annual decrease in
employment, while employers involved in the provision of services
experienced a 6.77 percent annual decrease.24 Furthermore, these changes
in the aggregate were incredibly sharp. The chart below shows the drastic
decrease in employment relative to the last business cycle peak in the
United States, as compared to prior recessions.25

18. Gita Gopinath, The Great Lockdown: Worst Economic Downturn Since the Great Depression,
IMF (Apr. 14, 2020), https://blogs.imf.org/2020/04/14/the-great-lockdown-worst-economic-downturnsince-the-great-depression/.
19. This is likely because of the increase of leisure consumption inside the home, rather than in
the form of services outside the home. See The Pandemic Economy in Seven Numbers, NEW YORK TIMES
(Nov. 19, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/19/podcasts/the-daily/coronavirus-pandemic-useconomy-unemployment.html?showTranscript=1.
20. This is likely because of the sharp increase of at-home schooling and at-home work, as well
as ultra-low interest rates. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Ohio Labor Market Information, OHIO DEP'T OF JOB AND FAM. SERVS (Nov. 2020),
https://ohiolmi.com/Home/page85481/1/size85481/48?page85481=1&size85481=48#.
24. Id.
25. Fred Dews, Charts of the Week: Impacts of the Coronavirus Recession, BROOKINGS
INSTITUTE (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2020/09/11/charts-of-theweek-impacts-of-the-coronavirus-recession.
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These negative economic conditions will likely lead many Ohio
businesses and individuals to be unable or unwilling to perform their
contractual obligations. Furthermore, it is possible that contract breaches,
like the economic downturn itself, will not happen equally across all
sectors and all types of parties. This Comment discusses the defenses and
excuses that may allow these parties to escape contract performance in
the next Part of this Section.
B. Contract Defenses Generally
Contracting parties have historically been afforded several defenses for
nonperformance of a contract under unusual circumstances. This Part
focuses on one such defense that can often be found within the contract
itself, a force majeure clause, and three others that have developed at
common law, vis major, impossibility, and impracticability. This Part
outlines how these doctrines have been applied and interpreted under
Ohio law.
1. Force Majeure
The general purpose of a force majeure clause is to excuse
nonperformance of contractual obligations in light of an unforeseeable
extraordinary event that would make performance impossible or

Published by University of Cincinnati College of Law Scholarship and Publications, 2021
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impracticable.26 Different jurisdictions take different approaches to
interpreting these clauses in litigation, answering questions such as: (1)
Should a force majeure clause specifically define what constitutes a force
majeure event? (2) How strictly should foreseeability be interpreted? (3)
Should courts require that the force majeure event made contract
performance impossible, or merely impracticable? (4) Can the
nonperforming party be negligent and still invoke the force majeure
clause as a defense?27 The common law interpretation of force majeure
clauses is a relatively new concept for Ohio courts.28 Nevertheless, Ohio
courts have answered some of these interpretation questions, which are
outlined below.
First, courts in different jurisdictions must decide how specifically a
force majeure clause must define a qualifying event. As with other
contract provisions, Ohio courts first look to the language of a force
majeure clause to determine whether it applies in a given situation.29
Thus, if a contract’s force majeure clause includes an enumerated list of
specific qualifying events, the clause will be construed narrowly to cover
only those events listed, as well as events that are sufficiently similar
under the rule of ejusdem generis.30 Ejusdem generis refers to the
principle where, if a law lists classes of people or things, that list is used
to clarify the other items within it.31 For example, if a force majeure clause
listed “war, abnormal weather conditions, and anything beyond the
reasonable control of the parties,” ejusdem generis would dictate that the
catchall may include events similar to war and abnormal weather
conditions like terrorist attacks or earthquakes but may not include
dissimilar events like labor strikes or economic downturns.32
A lack of similarity between the listed force majeure events and the
actual event at issue was a key factor in an Ohio Court of Common Pleas’
analysis of the force majeure clause in Dunaj v. Glassmeyer. In Dunaj, a
hotel management company sued the owners of two hotels for
reinstatement of the company as manager of the hotels pursuant to an
earlier management agreement.33 The management agreement contained

26. WILLISTON, supra note 4.
27. Force Majeure State Case Law Summary Chart: Overview, PRACTICAL LAW COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS, Westlaw (database updated October 5, 2020).
28. Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 67 N.E.3d 845, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
29. Id.
30. United Arab Shipping Co. v. PB Express, Inc., No. 96162, 2011 WL 3860639 (Ohio Ct. App.
Sept. 1, 2011).
31. Damian
McNair,
Force
Majeure
Clauses,
DLA
PIPER
(2011),
https://www.dlapiper.com/~/media/files/insights/publications/2012/06/iforce-majeureiclauses/files/forcemajeureclauses/fileattachment/forcemajeureclauses.pdf.
32. Id.
33. Dunaj v. Glassmeyer, 580 N.E.2d 98, 99 (Ohio C.P. 1990).
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a force majeure clause, which allowed that nonperformance may be
excused in the following circumstances:
When prevented by any ‘force majeure’ cause beyond the reasonable
control of such party (except financial inability of such party) such as
strike, lockout, breakdown, accident, compliance with an order or
regulation of any governmental authority, failure of supply or inability, by
the exercise of reasonable diligence, to obtain supplies, parts or employees
necessary to perform such obligation, or war or other emergency.34

The hotel owners argued that the termination of the plaintiff management
company had been warranted, because the hotel management company
had not met certain cash flow benchmarks.35 The plaintiff countered that
the force majeure clause in their management agreement, which listed
specific events like “fire, war, strikes, and acts of God,” excused their
inability to meet these goals.36 The qualifying force majeure event,
according to the plaintiffs, was shifting economic conditions caused by
increased competition from other hotels.37 The court determined that
because the force majeure clause had elucidated specific catastrophic
events, and the increased economic competition was not sufficiently
similar to any of them,38 the plaintiff’s nonperformance was not
excused.39
Alternatively, if the force majeure clause does not list specific events
and is written broadly, Ohio courts will construe the clause broadly.40 In
Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., lessors of oil and gas rights
sued the lessee, seeking a declaratory judgment that the lease had expired
due to the lessee’s non-production.41 The lease contained a force majeure
clause reading “[w]hen drilling, reworking, production or other operation
are prevented or delayed by inability to obtain necessary access or
easements, or by any other cause not reasonably within Lessee’s control,
this lease shall not terminate because of such prevention or delay.”42 The
lessee argued that a qualifying force majeure event—the owner of the
surface rights prohibiting the lessee’s access to the property to extract the
oil and gas—had caused and thereby excused its nonperformance under
the contract.43 An Ohio Court of Appeals determined that the catch-all
34. Id. at 100.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. In fact, the plaintiffs’ issue was arguably closer to a “financial inability” carve out, also in the
clause, than to any of the listed qualifying force majeure events. Id.
39. Id.
40. Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 67 N.E.3d 845, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
41. Id. at 848.
42. Id. at 846-847.
43. Id. at 849.
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phrase “any other cause not reasonably within Lessee’s control” could be
construed to describe the event in question because of how broadly the
clause as a whole was written.44 Therefore, the lessee’s nonperformance
was excused.45
Second, some jurisdictions consider how foreseeable an event must be
in order for performance to be avoided under a force majeure clause.46 A
party’s mistaken assumptions about future events or economic outcomes
do not excuse non-performance under a force majeure clause in Ohio.47
To some extent, parties are expected to foresee economic fluctuations and
downturns and factor them into contract formation.48
For example, in Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Services, Inc., an
electricity broker sued a purchaser, seeking a declaratory judgment that
the force majeure clause in their interchange agreement excused the
broker’s failure to deliver electrical power.49 The force majeure clause
specifically excused nonperformance resulting from “any cause or event
not reasonably within the control of the Party claiming Force Majeure,
and not attributable solely to such Party's neglect, including but not
limited to. . . [an] act of God or the public enemies, breakage or accident
to machinery [or] transmission lines. . .”50 The failure to deliver electricity
transpired after the broker’s suppliers refused to supply the requisite
electrical power, and the broker could only find a replacement source at
an inflated cost.51 The court determined that the inability to purchase a
commodity at an expected price was not a force majeure event, because
mere economic hardship could not be considered such an event.52
Third, courts in different jurisdictions will consider whether the force
majeure event must make performance impossible or impracticable in
order to excuse nonperformance.53 Ohio courts have determined that a
force majeure clause cannot excuse nonperformance merely because
performance became difficult, burdensome, or economically
disadvantageous.54
44. Id. at 850.
45. Id.
46. See Watson Laboratories, Inc. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 1099, 1111 (C.D.
Cal. 2001).
47. Dunaj v. Glassmeyer, 580 N.E.2d 98, 101 (Ohio C.P. 1990).
48. Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Services, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
49. Id. at 456.
50. Id. at 455.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 457.
53. See Home Devco/Tivoli Isles LLC v. Silver, 26 So.3d 718, 722 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010)
(“[F]orce majeure clauses broader than the scope of impossibility are enforceable under Florida law”);
but see Sunseri v. Garcia & Maggini Co., 148 A. 81, 82 (Pa. 1929) (holding that Pennsylvania courts
should only apply force majeure clauses to impossible events).
54. Stand Energy, 760 N.E.2d at 457.
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For instance, in United Gulf Marine, LLC v. Continental Refining Co.,
a fire occurred at the defendant’s oil refinery, which the defendant argued
was a force majeure event excusing it from taking truck shipments of
product from the plaintiff pursuant to their original agreement.55 The
parties had a force majeure clause in their agreement stating:
[D]ue to acts of God . . . fires. . . transportation difficulties. . . other
industrial disturbances, or for any other cause or causes beyond its
reasonable control, it is agreed that on such party's giving notice and full
particulars of such force majeure to the other party, the obligations of the
party giving notice shall be suspended. . . The term force majeure shall not
apply to those events which merely make it more difficult or costly for
Seller or Buyer to perform their obligations hereunder.56

An Ohio Court of Common Pleas determined that the original contract
had not required that the defendant actually be physically able to process
the product—the force majeure clause would only excuse performance if
it became impossible for the defendant to accept shipments of the
product.57 The defendant’s trucks had not been damaged, so although
taking new deliveries might have been impractical for the defendant, it
was not legally impracticable or impossible.58
Fourth, different jurisdictions have different requirements for how
faultless the nonperforming party must be in order to invoke a force
majeure clause. In Ohio, the nonperforming party must prove that the
force majeure event in question was beyond its control and occurred
without its fault or negligence.59 In United Gulf Marine, the court
conceded that the fire damaging the defendant’s oil refinery had been
beyond the defendant’s control, occurring without its fault or negligence,
which excused the defendant’s nonperformance notwithstanding the force
majeure clause.60
Ohio does not have as well-developed case law in the area of force
majeure clauses as some other states with a higher volume of business
litigation, such as New York, or a higher volume of natural disasters, like
Louisiana or Texas,61 which means that the future development of this
area can draw inspiration from the laws of other jurisdictions. Other
jurisdictions and scholars in contract law have considered other important
55. United Gulf Marine, LLC v. Continental Refining Co., No. CV 2017 0040, 2018 WL
10036528 (Ohio C.P. Feb. 27, 2018).
56. Id. at *2.
57. Id. at *5.
58. Id.
59. Stand Energy, 760 N.E.2d at 457 (the case does not elucidate what the actual cause of the fire
was, but the fault and negligence of the defendant was not at issue).
60. United Gulf Marine, 2018 WL 10036528.
61. As of November 2020, a search on Westlaw for cases involving force majeure clauses yields
eleven cases in Ohio, but 49 in New York, forty in Louisiana, and 72 in Texas.
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issues related to the interpretation of force majeure clauses, such as the
burden of proof,62 the nature of causation between the force majeure event
and the party’s nonperformance,63 notice requirements for the
nonperforming party,64 requirements for mitigation efforts,65 and whether
nonperformance is excused temporarily during the force majeure event or
permanently.
From the other rules of construction outlined above, it is likely that
Ohio courts will primarily utilize the text of the contract itself to interpret
force majeure clauses in the future. It is unclear how Ohio courts will
interpret force majeure clauses that do not provide explicit answers to
litigants’ questions.
2. Contract Defenses
In addition to parties contractually protecting themselves from liability
for breach of contract due to unforeseen or extraordinary events, courts
will sometimes excuse nonperformance in light of such events regardless
of whether the contract in question contained a force majeure clause.66
These defenses include vis major, impossibility, and impracticability.
Each will be discussed in turn below.
The most similar common law defense to the force majeure clause is
vis major, also known as the “act of God” defense.67 Essentially, this
allows a court to excuse nonperformance due to a force majeure-type
event, even if the parties did not include a force majeure clause in their
contracts.68 Accordingly, the vis major defense is very similar to the force

62. See Maralex Resources, Inc. v. Gilbreath, 76 P.3d 626 (N.M. 2003) (determining that in New
Mexico, the burden of proof is on the breaching party to invoke and prove the propriety of using a force
majeure clause); Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 9 P.3d 1204 (Idaho 2000) (holding the same in
Idaho).
63. See Oosten v. Hay Haulers Dairy Emp. & Helpers Union, 291 P.2d 17 (Cal. 1955) (holding
that a force majeure event must be the proximate cause of the breaching party’s nonperformance in
California); Florida Power Corp. v. City of Tallahassee, 18 So.2d 671 (Fla. 1944) (determining that the
force majeure event must be the sole proximate cause of nonperformance in Florida).
64. See BAE Sys. Ordinance Sys., Inc. v. El Dorado Chem. Co., Civil No. 1:15-cv-01035, 2016
WL 10647120 (W.D. Ark. Sept. 27, 2016) (where written notice of breach due to force majeure was
required in Arkansas); Milford Power Co. v. Alstom Power, Inc., 822 A.2d 196 (Conn. 2003) (notice must
be timely and specific in Connecticut).
65. See Hewitt v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 426 S.W.2d 27 (Mo. 1968) (holding
that, under Missouri law, the breaching party could not successfully invoke a force majeure clause because
the damage from the flood was partially due to its neglect); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allied-General
Nuclear Services, 731 F.Supp. 850 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (Illinois requires that the breaching party make a bona
fide effort to shed the restraint that is preventing its performance).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS CH. 11, INTRODUCTORY NOTE (AM. LAW. INST.
1981).
67. 18 OHIO JUR. 3D Contracts § 208 (2020).
68. Id.
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majeure provision but with a few added restrictions.69 While a force
majeure clause can specify any list of qualifying force majeure events to
which courts must give effect, Ohio courts will only allow a vis major
defense if the event in question is purely natural and occurs without
human cause or intervention.70 Furthermore, the vis major event must be
truly out of the ordinary, rather than typical natural occurrences like
fluctuations in weather that are usual for the geographic area (although
such natural occurrences could theoretically be incorporated into a
contractual force majeure clause).71 Finally, the vis major event must
render performance absolutely impossible, such as when the subject of
the contract is completely destroyed.72
Next, there is the defense of impossibility. Under Ohio law,
impossibility is a valid defense for nonperformance if, after the contract
is entered into, an unforeseeable event arises, rendering performance by
one of the parties impossible.73 However, performance is not excused
merely because performance is difficult, dangerous, or onerous.74 In that
sense, the impossibility defense acts similarly to a force majeure clause
with its unforeseeability requirement, but it is ascribed to an event by the
courts rather than by the terms of the contract.75
Ohio courts have not applied impossibility in the pandemic context, but
they have recognized when other catastrophic events might make
performance impossible (or not impossible, as the case may be). For
instance, during World War II, the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio determined that even if war conditions and government
regulations rendered performance difficult or unprofitable, performance
could not be considered impossible under the law unless a party truly
could not perform.76 In other words, the impossibility bar is hard to meet
even under the most extreme political and economic hardships. However,
there is one notable exception. One Ohio Court of Appeals ruled that a
government order may make performance impossible for parties under
the law, and a court could not enforce a contract requiring parties to break

69. Id.
70. Fiber Crete Constr. Corp. v. L.W.L. G.P., No. 2-86-24, 1987 WL 19038 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
13, 1987).
71. Id.
72. D.J. Lavy Constr. Co. v. Jordan, No. 91CA-12, 1992 WL 79622 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 10,
1992).
73. Truetried Service Co. v. Hager, 691 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
74. State ex rel. Jewett v. Sayre, 109 N.E. 636, 639 (Ohio 1914).
75. Haverhill Glen, LLC v. Eric Petroleum Corp., 67 N.E.3d 845, 850 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016).
76. Ohio Citizens Trust Co. v. Air-Way Electric Appliance Corp., 56 F.Supp. 1010, 1017 (N.D.
Ohio 1944).
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the law as a matter of public policy.77
A third common law defense for nonperformance that is closely related
to impossibility is impracticability. Proving impracticability of
performance is somewhat less burdensome for the nonperforming party
than proving impossibility, because the party does not have to prove that
performance was actually impossible but rather just extremely
inconvenient or costly.78 Under Ohio contract law, to successfully invoke
the defense of impracticability, the nonperforming party must show that
a supervening event occurred, the non-occurrence of which was a basic
assumption on which the contract was made, and the event rendered
performance impracticable.79 Ohio courts are split as to whether
unforeseeability is a prerequisite for impracticability, as it is for
impossibility.80 Despite the lower standard for the nonperforming party
for impracticability, impracticability still must mean something more than
mere impracticality.81 A party must make reasonable efforts to overcome
obstacles to performance, and performance only becomes impracticable
when the risk of injury to people or property is disproportionate to the
ends that performance would bring.82
C. Law and Economics Principles
Law and economics principles underpin the defenses outlined above in
Part B. Law and economics is a somewhat controversial school of
jurisprudence that borrows from economic theories and applies them to
the law, either descriptively or normatively.83 Implicitly or explicitly,
many courts utilize law and economics by subscribing to the efficient
breach theory of contract law when assessing whether a party may avoid
performance.84 Under efficient breach, the non-performing promisor will
77. Ass’n of Cleveland Fire Fighters, Local 93 of the Int’l Ass’n of Fire Fighters v. City of
Cleveland, No. 94631, 2010 WL 4684736 (Ohio Ct. App. Nov. 18, 2010).
78. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Impossibility, Impracticability, and Frustration, 1 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
207, 210 (2009).
79. Bank One, Marion v. Marion, Ohio, Internal Medicine Inc., No. 9-96-69, 1997 WL 176140
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1997).
80. See Truetried Service Co. v. Hager, 691 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (where the
Eighth District held foreseeability to be an element of impracticability), Bank One, 1997 WL 176140
(where the Third District held foreseeability to be an element of impracticability). The courts following
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts definition of impracticability do not treat foreseeability as an
element of impracticability.
81. See B-Right Trucking Co. v. Warfab Field Machining and Erection Corp., No. 2000-T-0072,
2001 WL 1602687 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 14, 2001) (“‘[I]mpracticability’ means more than
‘impracticality.’”).
82. Id. at 5.
83. Anita Bernstein, Whatever Happened to Law and Economics? 64 MARYLAND L. REV. 303,
304 (2005).
84. Thomas J. Loeb, Judicial Application of the Efficient Breach Theory: A Critical Examination,
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breach his or her contractual obligations (and therefore have to invoke
any of the above defenses) if doing so would make the promisor better off
and the promisee no worse off (in other words, if doing so would be Pareto
efficient).85 While this is certainly an accurate description of some
breaches of contract, it relies on certain assumptions—in particular, that
both parties are equally sophisticated and rational86—that are simply
inaccurate, especially during a catastrophic event like the COVID-19
pandemic.
The study of law and economics may offer other insights for courts
seeking to understand how to allocate damages when parties breach their
contractual obligations. Law and economics is particularly associated
with the neoclassical Chicago school of economics and with
deregulation,87 but it has also been utilized by more pro-regulation legal
scholars, like Cass Sunstein, who updated the field with his consideration
of behavioral economics and non-rational actors.88 In other words, it is a
framework that can be utilized by different judges with different judicial
philosophies to either preserve or move past the efficient breach theory.
One concept from law and economics that might prove useful is the
least-cost avoider theory.89 The basic principle of the least-cost avoider,
which is most commonly applied in torts cases, is that when there is an
accident which serves as a sunk cost, the party best equipped to mitigate
the aggregate damage—either before, during, or after the accident—or for
whom mitigation is less costly should bear the majority of the costs for
mitigation.90 In the contracts context, when there is a loss for which the
contracting parties did not provide (like a change in market price or a
natural disaster), a court can efficiently assign the costs associated with
that loss to the party who could have mitigated the loss either ex ante or
post ante.91 This is because many courts want to create default rules that
will ensure that parties take optimal and effective precautions before they
wind up in court.92
Another concept in law and economics relates to opportunism, which

30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 893 (2017).
85. Id. at 893-894.
86. Id. at 896.
87. James R. Hackney, Jr., Law and Neoclassical Economics: Science, Politics, and the
Reconfiguration of American Tort Law Theory, 15 L. & HIST. REV. 275 (1997).
88. Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).
89. William Barnett II, Walter Block, and Gene Callahan, The Paradox of Coase as a Defender
of Free Markets, NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 1075, 1086 (2005).
90. Id.
91. George M. Cohen, The Negligence-Opportunism Tradeoff in Contract Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 941 (1992).
92. Id. at 946.
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refers to taking advantage of another party’s vulnerability.93 The two key
vulnerabilities outlined by law and economics scholars are information
asymmetry (where one or both parties knows considerably less than
required to make an optimal bargain) and sequential performance (where
the first moving party who makes non-recoverable investments is at the
mercy of the second moving party to ensure the value of those
investments).94 According to theorists, courts should be concerned with
preventing parties from behaving opportunistically—in other words, from
acting on information that the other party lacks or from taking advantage
of a party that already has sunk costs into non-recoverable investments.95
Although the concept of opportunism is less often applied in courts than
the concept of least-cost avoiders, opportunism is well-suited to contract
law as it currently exists.
III. DISCUSSION
Contract law as it currently exists in Ohio has not been informed by
massive disasters. There are very few relevant precedential cases in
Ohio96 from the 1918 influenza pandemic97 and only a few from the wars
of the twentieth century.98 In other words, much of the case law in Ohio
concerns minor emergencies and accidents rather than major
catastrophes, differing from cases that New York courts had to grapple
with after the September 11th attacks99 or Louisiana courts after Hurricane
Katrina.100 Therefore, Ohio’s case law may not present clear models for
courts to use during the COVID-19 pandemic.
This Section lays out ways that Ohio courts might treat parties seeking
to back out of contract performance due to the COVID-19 pandemic. To
illustrate, this Section will apply Ohio law to a current case in Delaware
to see how the results might turn out in that scenario. The chosen
illustration is a high-profile matter from Delaware involving the thwarted
acquisition of Victoria’s Secret from a struggling L Brands by the buyout
93. Id. at 954.
94. Id. at 954-955.
95. Id.
96. See Montgomery v. Bd. of Educ. Of Liberty Twp., Union Cnty., 131 N.E. 497 (Ohio 1921).
97. Other jurisdictions, and other areas of law, also have case law specifically addressing the 1918
flu pandemic. See Citrus Soap Co. v. Peet Bros. Mfg. Co., 194 P. 715 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1920); Napier
v. Trace Fork Mining Co., 235 S.W. 766 (Ky. Ct. App. 1921); Sandry v. Brooklyn School Dist. No. 78 of
Williams Cnty., 182 N.W. 689 (N.D. 1921).
98. See Trimble v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 82 N.E.2d 548 (Ohio Ct. App. 1948).
99. See Bush v. Protravel Intern., Inc., 192 Misc.2d 743 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2002); Lava Trading, Inc.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 365 F.Supp.2d 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
100. See Lila, Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 994 So.2d 139 (La. Ct. App. 2008); View
West Condominium Ass’n v. Aspen Specialty Ins. Co., No. 11-20423-CIV, 2011 WL 3704782 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 23, 2011).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol90/iss1/7

14

Gates: Force Majeure, Vis Major, Impossibility, and Impracticability Und

2021]

FORCE MAJEURE

297

firm Sycamore Partners.101 Part A of this Section will apply Ohio case
law to the Victoria’s Secret deal gone wrong. Part B of this Section will
then explore the potential shifts that Ohio contract law could take as a
normative evolution in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
A. Application of Ohio Law to Contracts During the COVID-19
Pandemic
This Part discusses how courts ought to apply Ohio contract law to
cases arising from the COVID-19 pandemic through the specific
illustration of the Victoria’s Secret deal. This application will reveal some
significant inflexibilities in Ohio contract law, which courts may find
unjust in the pandemic context. First, this Part explains how force majeure
clauses might be interpreted (most of which would have been written prior
to the pandemic). Next, this Part will discuss the application of common
law defenses of vis major, impossibility, and impracticability.
1. Force Majeure
In the recent Victoria’s Secret deal, L Brands sought to separate its
subsidiary Victoria’s Secret and place it in a privately-held company that
was majority-owned by one of Sycamore Partners’ affiliates.102 The
parties entered into a transaction agreement on February 20, 2020, which
provided in part that, prior to closing, L Brands would operate Victoria’s
Secret “in the ordinary course consistent with past practice.”103 However,
during the pandemic, L Brands closed almost all Victoria’s Secret stores,
furloughed employees, and reduced base compensation. This caused
Sycamore Partners to sue to terminate the deal in Delaware Chancery
Court due to L Brands’ breach of the Transaction Agreement.104
However, L Brands had been able to carve out certain excuses for
nonperformance in the Transaction Agreement’s Material Adverse Effect
(“MAE”) clause, including “the existence, occurrence or continuation of
any pandemics . . .”105
101. James B. Stewart, The Victoria’s Secret Contract that Anticipated a Pandemic, NEW YORK
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/business/victorias-secret-sycamorecoronavirus.html.
102. Verified Compl., SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc., Del. Ch. 2020 (C.A. No. 2020-0297).
103. Id. at 3-4.
104. Id. at 3.
105. SP VS Buyer LP, Transaction Agreement (Exhibit 2.1) (Feb. 20, 2020). The MAE clause
indicates that a materially adverse event “means any state of facts. . . (i) that would. . . materially impede
the performance by Parent of its obligations under this Agreement. . . or (ii) that has a material adverse
effect on the financial condition. . . of the Business, excluding, in the case of clause (ii), any state of facts.
. . directly or indirectly resulting from. . . pandemics. . .”
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It may be helpful to treat the MAE clause carveout like a force majeure
clause and decipher how an Ohio court might construe it in favor of or
against L Brands if such a case were to be decided under Ohio law. First,
regarding specificity, Ohio courts defer to the language of the contract to
determine how narrowly a force majeure clause should be construed. A
force majeure clause listing a specific set of events will be construed
narrowly by Ohio courts, while one with broad categories such as “any
cause not reasonably within the parties’ control” is likely to be construed
more broadly.106
If parties in Ohio write contracts after the pandemic and wish for events
like pandemics, quarantines, and shutdowns to be considered force
majeure events, then they can best ensure that courts will extend the force
majeure clause defense to such events by specifying those events within
the clause. That is the approach recommended by the Thompson Reuters
Practical Law editors who updated their recommended standard force
majeure clauses in March 2020 to include “other potential disaster(s) or
catastrophe(s), such as epidemics, pandemics, or quarantines.”107 Parties
can choose to make their lists of force majeure events in several different
ways, but in either case the Practical Law editors recommend specific
pandemic-inclusive language.108 Clearly, the MAE carveout specifically
listing “pandemics” in the Victoria’s Secret deal would pass this
requirement with flying colors.109
Next, regarding foreseeability, Ohio courts seem to expect parties to
foresee economic fluctuations and downturns and factor them into
contract formation as well as the drafting of force majeure clauses.110 For
example, the court in Stand Energy held a price increase was not a force
majeure event because price changes ought to be foreseeable by the
parties at the time of contract formation.111
Foreseeability may be a sticking point for parties seeking to avoid
performance. Although the economic downturn caused by the COVID-19
pandemic is worse than any since the Great Depression, it is nevertheless
a market fluctuation that Ohio courts would probably deem foreseeable—
at least to an extent—because the economy is always cycling either into
or away from a downturn. Moreover, many public health experts

106. Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Services, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 455 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
107. General Contract Clauses: Force Majeure (OH), Practical Law Commercial Transactions
(Mar. 31, 2020).
108. Id.
109. This is particularly true because the drafters specifically included “any state of facts,
circumstance, condition, event, change, development, occurrence, result or effect to the extent directly or
indirectly resulting from. . . pandemics. . .” SP VS Buyer LP, supra note 106.
110. In re Millers Cove Energy Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1995).
111. Stand Energy, 760 N.E.2d at 457.
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predicted a catastrophic pandemic throughout the 2010s,112 and such
experts predicted that the COVID-19 pandemic itself would have dire
international effects as early as January 2020,113 which may lead an Ohio
court to deem the pandemic itself to be foreseeable. In other words, the
attorneys for L Brands may have foreseen the pandemic and resulting
economic hardship and drafted the February 2020 Transaction Agreement
accordingly.
One key difference in the way different jurisdictions analyze force
majeure clauses is whether the event must render performance actually
impossible or merely impracticable. In Ohio, a force majeure clause
cannot excuse nonperformance merely because performance became
difficult, burdensome, or economically disadvantageous, but the standard
does not seem to rise to actual impossibility.114 However, just how
difficult contract performance must be in order to satisfy force majeure
has not been developed in Ohio case law.
This ambiguity may be a critical sticking point with courts trying to
interpret force majeure clauses during COVID-19, and the answer may
come down to timing. In March and April of 2020, the Ohio state
government shut down all nonessential businesses115 and issued a stay-athome order for all nonessential workers and activities. During that time,
many parties may have found that performance of contractual obligations
might have risen to very near the level of impossibility such that a force
majeure contract would excuse nonperformance. However, in the month
of May and thereafter, the state government gradually allowed these
nonessential businesses and activities to resume with strict public health
limitations.116 It is not clear whether mandates like capacity limitations,
social distancing, mask-wearing, and sanitization, or even the extreme
economic downturn, would be considered valid excuses for
nonperformance under a force majeure clause in Ohio. In any case, in the
112. Dana Vigue, Experts Predicted a Coronavirus Pandemic Years Ago. Now It’s Playing Out
Before Our Eyes, CNN (Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/08/health/coronavirus-pandemictraining-scenario/index.html.
113. Erin Schumaker, Timeline: How Coronavirus Got Started, ABC NEWS (Sept. 8, 2020),
https://abcnews.go.com/Health/timeline-coronavirus-started/story?id=69435165.
114. United Gulf Marine, LLC v. Continental Refining Co., No. CV 2017 0040, 2018 WL
10036528 (Ohio Ct. C.P. Feb. 27, 2018).
115. Essential businesses in Ohio include stores that sell groceries and medicine, food and beverage
production and agriculture, charitable and social services, religious entities, media, gas and transportation
businesses, financial institutions, hardware and supply store, certain critical trades, mail and shipping,
educational institutions, laundry services, home-based care, residential facilities, professional services,
manufacture and supply chain for certain critical products and industries, and funeral services. See
Director’s Stay At Home Order, OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH (Mar. 22, 2020),
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/static/DirectorsOrderStayAtHome.pdf.
116. Governor Announces Order to Reopen Certain Facilities, OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH (June 4,
2020),
https://coronavirus.ohio.gov/wps/portal/gov/covid-19/resources/news-releases-news-you-canuse/governor-reopen-certain-facilities.
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Victoria’s Secret example, L Brands may have been able to argue that
performance in the early months of the pandemic was actually impossible
due to government orders causing an extreme contraction in the retail
sector,117 which would have potentially helped its case.
Finally, regarding control of the nonperforming party, in order to
successfully use a contract’s force majeure clause as a defense for
nonperformance, the nonperforming party must prove that the force
majeure event in question was beyond its control and occurred without its
fault or negligence.118 This seems like an area in which the party seeking
nonperformance of contractual obligations would prevail. The trifecta of
issues surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic—the economic recession,
the government shutdowns and mandates, and the deadly virus itself—
would probably not be considered the result of the fault or negligence of
any party to a contract, unless one of those parties is the government itself.
In the Victoria’s Secret example, the pandemic and subsequent recession
were certainly none of the parties’ fault, so this requirement would likely
be satisfied in that case.
As shown above, L Brands was very lucky to have good legal
representation in the dealmaking process—ensuring that the MAE clause
carved out specific foreseeable events—meaning its force majeure
provision would likely carry significant weight under Ohio law.119
2. Vis Major
Vis major is more limited than its common law defense analogue force
majeure. First, Ohio courts will only allow a vis major defense if the event
in question is purely natural, meaning it occurs without human cause or
intervention.120 Second, the vis major event must be truly out of the
ordinary.121 Third, the vis major event must render performance
absolutely impossible.122
The first and second criteria seem like they would be relatively easy to
prove to an Ohio court. First, as a virus, COVID-19 is natural on its face
117. NEW YORK TIMES, supra note 20.
118. Stand Energy Corp. v. Cinergy Services, Inc., 760 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001).
119. The case did not move forward in Delaware, so it is unclear how the Delaware courts would
have interpreted the Transaction Agreement. As it was, the case settled, and both parties got away with
not paying a termination fee. Jenna Greene, Clean Break: Kirkland Client Can Walk Away from $525M
Victoria’s
Secret
Deal,
LITIGATION
DAILY
(May
4,
2020),
https://www.law.com/litigationdaily/2020/05/04/daily-dicta-clean-break-kirkland-client-can-walk-awayfrom-525m-victorias-secret-deal.
120. Fiber Crete Constr. Corp. v. L.W.L. G.P., No. 2-86-24, 1987 WL 19038 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct.
13, 1987).
121. Id.
122. D.J. Lavy Constr. Co. v. Jordan, No. 91CA-12, 1992 WL 79622 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 10,
1992).
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and is furthermore thought to be the result of zoonotic transfer from an
animal rather than laboratory manipulation.123 Second, pandemics on the
scale of COVID-19, producing deaths in the hundreds of thousands in a
matter of months, are uncommon in the United States in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries—the last pandemic in the United States on that
scale was arguably the 1968 flu pandemic.124
However, impossibility is an incredibly high bar for parties to meet. It
could perhaps be met if the parties could only perform their contractual
obligations by breaking state government mandates, as one Ohio Court of
Appeals allowed in Glickman v. Coakley.125 Otherwise, parties may have
a very difficult time proving this criterion. For instance, if the Victoria’s
Secret case was heard in Ohio courts, and L Brands had not included the
pandemic carveout in the MAE clause, they would have had to argue that
negative economic conditions rose to the level of actual impossibility—a
very difficult task, which probably could only have been sustained by
invoking the government order shutting down nonessential businesses in
March and April.
3. Impossibility and Impracticability
Under Ohio law, impossibility is a valid defense for nonperformance
if, after the contract is entered into, an unforeseeable event arises,
rendering performance by one of the parties impossible.126 However,
performance is not excused merely because performance is difficult,
dangerous, or onerous.127 On the other hand, to successfully invoke the
affirmative defense of impracticability, the nonperforming party must
show that a supervening event occurred, the non-occurrence of which was
a basic assumption on which the contract was made, and rendered
performance impracticable (rather than impossible).128 Ohio courts are
split as to whether unforeseeability is a prerequisite for impracticability,
as it is for impossibility.
Parties might be able to argue that performance was actually
impossible (rather than merely impracticable) in Ohio during March and
April 2020, when the state government ordered a shutdown of all
123. Kristian G. Anderen et al., The Proximal Origin of SARS-CoV-2, 26 NATURE MEDICINE 4
(Mar. 17, 2020).
124. Michael S. Rosenwald, History’s Deadliest Pandemics, from Ancient Rome to Modern
America,
WASHINGTON
POST
(Apr.
7,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/local/retropolis/coronavirus-deadliest-pandemics.
125. Glickman v. Coakley, 488 N.E.2d 906, 911 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984).
126. Truetried Service Co. v. Hager, 691 N.E.2d 1112, 1118 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
127. State ex rel. Jewett v. Sayre, 109 N.E. 636, 639 (Ohio 1914).
128. Bank One, Marion v. Marion, Ohio, Internal Medicine Inc., No. 9-96-69, 1997 WL 176140
(Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1997).
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nonessential businesses and activities, because many parties would have
been completely unable to operate.129 However, in May and afterwards,
nonessential businesses began resuming their normal activities, but did so
in a strongly regulated manner—with masks and social distancing, to
name a couple such regulations130—and with an increasingly unstable
workforce and customer base due to layoffs and illness. At that point,
Ohio courts would probably not consider performance actually
impossible because businesses could conduct many of their normal
activities, just in a very limited way. Therefore, after May 2020, parties
would likely be more successful using the defense of impracticability than
impossibility.
To assert an impracticability defense, the party seeking an excuse for
nonperformance would have to first show that a supervening event
occurred. This would be simple enough, as the COVID-19 pandemic has
been extremely well-documented. Next, the party would have to prove
that the non-occurrence of the pandemic was a basic assumption on which
the contract was made. This criterion is a bit trickier, because one has to
judge whether either party assumed the risk of the event occurring.131
Thus, an unforeseeable event would probably suggest that its nonoccurrence was a basic assumption upon which the contract was made.132
Other factors highlighted by the Restatement are the relative bargaining
power of the two parties and the effectiveness of the market in spreading
the risks at issue.133
So, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is likely that neither
party would have assumed the risk of Ohio’s stay-at-home order and
global pandemic, as no such incident has occurred in any living person’s
lifetime, although one or more parties may have assumed the risk of a
recession. If one or more parties are legally sophisticated and
economically powerful entities (for example, L Brands and Sycamore
Partners in the Victoria’s Secret deal) but did not include a force majeure
clause to mitigate risk, then some courts may be less likely to hold that
impracticability has been satisfied in the case.134 Last, the risks at issue
have not been spread evenly by the market thus far in 2020, with vastly
different impacts on groups of different socioeconomic classes, 135 which
129. OHIO DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 17.
130. Id.
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, cmt. c (AM. LAW. INST. 1981).
132. Id. at CH. 11, INTRODUCTORY NOTE.
133. Id.
134. J. Denmon Sigler & Scott Shelton, “Could the Parties Have Anticipated the Unthinkable?”
Force Majeure in the Texas Energy Industry after COVID-19, TEXAS LAWBOOK (Apr. 2, 2020),
https://texaslawbook.net/could-the-parties-have-anticipated-the-unthinkable-force-majeure-in-the-texasenergy-industry-after-covid-19.
135. Bauer, supra note 6.
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could impact a court’s determination of whether the pandemic was an
event whose non-occurrence was a basic assumption upon which the
contract was made, depending on who the parties are.
Finally, the party would have to show that COVID-19 made
performance impracticable. Again, how impracticable performance might
be for any given business during the pandemic would probably be
strongly dependent on the time when performance was supposed to occur,
the essential or nonessential nature of the business, and the economic
power of the business prior to the COVID-19 pandemic.
B. Normative Shifts in Ohio Contract Law During and After COVID-19
This Comment has thus far described contract provisions and defenses
during COVID-19 descriptively rather than normatively. Because this is
an emerging area of the law and the economy, where courts, businesses,
government entities, and individual people are scrambling to respond and
build a new normal, Ohio courts need to establish a description of the law
as it is.
However, jurists in Ohio should also take this crisis as an opportunity
to consider how the law ought to be. Who benefits and who loses under
the law as it is written? Who are the parties who most desperately need a
win in 2020? And how can Ohio courts shape common law to help make
the economy and society whole? L Brands may have been able to get off
relatively easily, but what about a smaller seller with less sophisticated
legal counsel?
None of the aforementioned contract principles make it easy for parties
to escape performance of their contractual obligations. Each of them has
sticking points around foreseeability as well as the impossibility and
impracticability standards. But as the Restatement authors wrote,
“[c]ontract liability is strict liability.”136 In a normal and ideal world, that
is probably for the best. It ensures that parties take the utmost care before
they enter into a contract and in return gain the flexibility to provide for
mutually favorable terms within the scope of an individual transaction or
relationship. If a party breaches a contract, it does so because, under
efficient breach theory, it would make them better off and the opposing
party no worse off.
However, during the COVID-19 pandemic, neither Ohio nor any other
jurisdiction in the United States is normal or ideal, and it is difficult to
expect parties to act rationally under such circumstances. While the
CARES Act and the Paycheck Protection Program saw Congress

136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, CH. 11, INTRODUCTORY NOTE (AM. LAW. INST.
1981).
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attempting to bolster small businesses back in March, further federal relief
was not forthcoming for the remainder of 2020.137 Small companies and
individual people have unquestionably borne the burden of this, with
smaller firms laying off more people than larger ones, only 14 percent of
small businesses receiving Paycheck Protection Program loans, and at
least 2 percent of small businesses shutting permanently.138 This will
almost certainly lead to failures of contract performance between
manufacturers, suppliers, and retailers on a massive scale. These parties
may or may not be able to evade litigation, an extremely time-consuming
and expensive endeavor, without financial ruination.
Ohio courts should proceed with some grace for parties on both sides
of this matter and for the economic and legal system as a whole. This is
where law and economics principles, particularly the least-cost avoider
and opportunism, could be instructive.
One way courts could assess breaches of contract would be to adopt
the principle of the least cost avoider for contract cases arising from the
COVID-19 pandemic. After all, the least cost avoider, or cheapest cost
avoider, is a well-established principle in tort liability.139 However, it is
less commonly applied in contract law, though such applications are not
unheard of.140 The least cost avoider principle holds that whoever has the
lowest cost of avoiding harm, whether by prevention, mitigation, or
insurance, should generally be assigned liability when that harm
occurs.141 This is a particularly appealing framework when both parties
are faultless,142 as the parties struggling over performance or
nonperformance during a global pandemic would both likely be.
Redrawn for the contracts context, courts could construe the least cost
avoider as the drafter, who can avoid mistakes by exercising greater care
in drafting contracts.143 Courts could also make judgments specific to the
type of contract and parties involved. For instance, in a franchiseefranchisor relationship, the franchisor might be the least cost avoider, as
it would be in a better position to identify and spread risks to the economic
137. JORDAIN CARNEY, CORONAVIRUS RELIEF AT A STANDSTILL WITH NO LEADERSHIP-LEVEL TALKS,
THE HILL (NOV. 18, 2020), HTTPS://THEHILL.COM/HOMENEWS/SENATE/526509-CORONAVIRUSRELIEF-AT-A-STANDSTILL-WITH-NO-LEADERSHIP-LEVEL-TALKS.
138. Heather Long, Small Business Used to Define America’s Economy. The Pandemic Could
Change
That
Forever,
WASHINGTON
POST
(May
12,
2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/05/12/small-business-used-define-americas-economypandemic-could-end-that-forever.
139. See Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d 732 (7th Cir. 1999).
140. Cohen, supra note 91.
141. Id.
142. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, 5 F.3d 554
(D.C. Cir. 1993).
143. Extrusion Painting, Inc. v. Awnings Unlimited, Inc., No. 00-1682, 2002 WL 1402192 (6th
Cir. June 27, 2002).
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health of its products.144 Generally, in a contractual dispute with two
relatively faultless parties, the least cost avoider will be the more
economically and legally sophisticated entity. In a dispute between a more
sophisticated party and a less sophisticated party arising from the
COVID-19 pandemic, the more sophisticated party may be more
financially solvent and better able to shoulder a late delivery of goods or
late payments on a loan or mortgage—to name a few ways this could play
out in court.
Another law and economics concept Ohio courts might choose to apply
in the COVID-19 pandemic context is opportunism, where courts would
attempt to punish a party that tries to take advantage of another party’s
information asymmetry or sunk costs. Unlike the least-cost avoider, this
concept could be used to the benefit of both highly sophisticated and less
sophisticated parties. For instance, in a loan transaction, a borrower may
have limited information on what he is entitled to from the Paycheck
Protection Program, and a court might attempt to incentivize the lender to
act fairly notwithstanding the borrower’s lack of knowledge.
In the area of employment law, employers often sink relatively large
resources into recruiting and training new employees145 and count on
employees to not take advantage of these sunk resources by taking the
training and transferring to another position. Although the COVID-19
pandemic has caused widespread unemployment, there are certain
sectors, like healthcare, where workers are scarce.146 It would be
opportunistic behavior—and likely a breach of contract—for a doctor or
nurse to receive training at one hospital and then attempt to move to
another one that might pay more. Courts could attempt to dissuade this
kind of opportunistic behavior as well.
Of course, Ohio courts may not want to apply such principles in every
breach of contract matter, or for all eternity, even after the COVID-19
pandemic has ended. However, innovative legal concepts like those
proposed in this Section may give parties that are already struggling due
to the pandemic some much-needed relief.
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts will need to develop good principles of contract interpretation,

144. Freedman Truck Ctr., Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 784 F. Supp. 167 (D.N.J. 1992).
145. John Hall, The Cost of Turnover Can Kill Your Business and Make Things Less Fun, FORBES
(May 9, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnhall/2019/05/09/the-cost-of-turnover-can-kill-yourbusiness-and-make-things-less-fun/?sh=8833b4794371.
146. Alexis C. Madrigal, Hospitals Can’t Go On Like This: Twenty-Two Percent of American
Hospitals Don’t Have Enough Workers Right Now, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 17, 2020),
https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2020/11/third-surge-hospitals-staffing-shortage/617128.
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because the effects of COVID-19 will outlive the virus itself. Even with
vaccines approved for distribution in December 2020, COVID-19 will not
disappear overnight. After vaccination, individuals would still need to
engage in social distancing, likely for much of 2021.147 The most
optimistic scenario seems to place the reemergence of normal nonpandemic life at the end of 2021 or beginning of 2022.148 Until then,
Americans and Ohioans will continue to get sick and die, and the
economy will probably continue to suffer from the lockdowns and the
public health crisis.
Furthermore, even when COVID-19 is in society’s rearview mirror,
other deadly pandemics are likely to arise.149 Even without an epidemic
or pandemic in the United States, the economy will fluctuate in its regular
boom and bust cycles. All of this is not meant to catastrophize but rather
contextualize the importance of understanding how Ohio courts apply
contract law. Disasters, large and small, individual and societal, will
always occur, and these disasters will cause (whether indirectly or
directly) parties to breach the contracts they make in more halcyon times.
This will require parties to understand how best to draft force majeure
clauses in their contracts, and how to invoke contract defenses if these
clauses fail to protect them. It is also an opportunity for Ohio courts to
better develop their contract law jurisprudence, incorporating behavioral
economics principles to adequately allocate risks in good times and bad.
Developing laws that are both flexible enough, so that parties already
struggling do not go further underwater, and sensible enough, so that
parties can foresee their results at the outset of contract formation, will
ensure that Ohio courts can stabilize the state economy at any given point.

147. Jade Scipioni, Dr. Fauci Says Masks, Social Distancing Will Still be Needed After a Covid19 Vaccine—Here’s Why, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/11/16/fauci-why-stillneed-masks-social-distancing-after-covid-19-vaccine.html.
148. Madeline Holcombe, Holly Yan, and Amir Vera, US May Not be Back to Normal Until 2022,
Fauci Says, CNN (Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/10/28/health/us-coronaviruswednesday/index.html.
149. Jonathan Chan and Sony Salzman, As COVID-19 Continues, Experts Warn of Next Pandemic
Likely to Come from Animals, ABC NEWS (Sept. 3, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/covid-19continues-experts-warn-pandemic-animals/story?id=72755696.
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